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Abstract: The word of corporate governance has become a very important concept that requires many 
countries around the world to concentrate on its reformation. Globalisation of markets, open markets 
competition, and international business has generated awareness about the importance of improving corporate 
governance practices. Protecting shareholders and other stakeholders are also being attentive agenda and play 
important roles in corporate governance reforms due to ensure their value creation and their right as the 
owner of the shares. This article attempts to address this issue by examining the relationship between 
ownership structure and firm performance. The hypothesis is tested by assessing the impact of the structure 
of ownership on firm performance, using data for 237 Malaysia Public Listed Companies (PLCs). Therefore, 
this paper will provide an insight into further understanding on the issue of the relationship between 
ownership structure and firm performance 
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Introduction 
Over the past decade, the term “corporate governance” has become an ordinary term by many level of people and 
there are now are more governance experts as compared to previous. The reformation of corporate governance has 
been believed can lead to better supervision and guidance of corporate behaviours (Iyengar, Williams &Zampelli, 
2005; Jensen &Meckling, 1976). Better governance results from an improvement of the internal corporate 
governance mechanisms, carried out by the board of directors, audit committees, internal auditors, control and risk 
managements and external mechanisms including external auditors and also shareholder protection (Hasnah, 2009). 
As noted the large number of studies say that corporate governance can be used to improve responsibility, 
accountability and transparency of the companies that will in turn increase the long term investment and credibility 
to the companies (Armitage & Marston, 2008; Holder-Webb, Cohen, Nath, & Wood, 2008; Jongsureyapart, 2006; 
Koh, Laplante, & Tong, 2007; Luo, 2005; Rueda-Sabater, 2000). International flow of investment and business 
requires that countries must decide if they will be involved in creating governance regulations or be governed in 
line with international requirements. Thus, corporate governance has become an international agenda item that 
affects the whole business world in order to develop good governance.  
 
In today’s uncertain economic times, shareholders demand more accountability from firm management. Indeed, 
individuals or investors will not simply invest in a firm without close involvement in ensuring their value creation is 
protected (Burnett, Xu, Morris and Rodriguez, 2012). Shareholders are becoming increasingly suspicious about 
directors’ ability and willingness to protect their interests, especially after various media reports of corporate 
scandals due to the misuse of corporate funds. Most visibly, shareholder activism usually plays out via the use of 
resolutions (proposals) presented and acted upon at annual meetings (Burnett, et al., 2012). Most investors cared 
little about how a company was actually run as they focused more on how the company’s stock performed despite 
 89 
 
the connection between the two (Romanek, 2011). As a result, shareholder activism over governance issues was 
practiced only by a few brave souls during the 20 the century. While most informed investors would define 
maximizing shareholder value as the primary task of the board of directors and senior management in every public 
company, this objective receives much less attention by the leadership of private companies (Evan and Bishop, 
2002). It is not that they don't care about maximizing the company's value and their wealth. From our experience in 
working with hundreds of such executives and shareholders, we know that most care passionately. 
 
According to Cadbury (2002) a basic debate on corporate governance arises from the conflict between the 
ownership of the companies (principal) and management (agent) has been highlighted by Berle and Means (1932) 
in their book The Modern Corporation and Private Property, which documented the existence of a “separation of 
ownership from control”. The book has generated numerous studies that hypothesized the nature of the conflict 
between owners (shareholders) and managers. The separation of ownership from management had resulted in 
shareholders being unable to exercise any control over boards of directors, who are theoretically appointed by them 
to represent their interests. 
 
 
Ownership Structure  
The polarisation of ownership structure arises from differences that exist between the cultures and legal systems of 
countries (Claessens et al., 2000; Guay, 2002). These differences have created two ownership structure systems: the 
insider-dominated ownership structure (concentrated shareholding); and, the outsider-dominated ownership 
structure (Anglo-Saxon world competitive)(La Porta et al., 1999; Solomon & Solomon, 2004). Asian countries like 
Malaysia, the Republic of Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, Hong Kong and Taiwan are characterised by the insider-
dominated ownership structure (Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000; Johnson et al., 2000; Nam & Nam, 2004; 
Thillainathan, 1999). Table 1 summarises the characteristics of each ownership structure and the legal systems. 
 
 
Table 1: Characteristic of ownership structure and legal systems 
Insider-dominated ownership structure 
(concentrated shareholding) 
Outsider-dominated ownership structure 
(dispersed shareholding) 
Firms owned predominantly by insider 
shareholders who also control management 
Large firms controlled by managers but owned 
predominantly by outside shareholders 
System characterised by little separation of 
ownership and control thus, agency problems are 
rare 
System characterised by separation of ownership and 
control, which engenders significant agency problems 
Hostile takeover activity is rare 
Frequent hostile takeovers acting as a disciplining 
practice on company management 
Concentration of ownership in a small group of 
shareholders (founding family members, other 
firms through pyramidal structures, state 
ownership) 
Dispersed ownership 
Excessive control by a small group of “insider” 
shareholders 
Moderate control by a large range of shareholders 
Wealth transfer from minority shareholders to 
majority shareholders 
No transfer of wealth from minority shareholders to 
majority shareholders 
Weak investor protection in company law Strong investor protection in company law 
Potential for abuse of power by majority 
shareholders 
Potential for shareholder democracy 
Majority shareholders tend to have more “voice” 
in their investee firms. 
Shareholding characterised more by “exit” than by 
“voice” 
Source: (Solomon & Solomon, 2004) 
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According to Fazilah (2002), the ownership structure determines the nature of the agency problem, whether the 
dominant conflict is between managers and shareholders, or between controlling and minority shareholders. In the 
Malaysian PLCs scenario, the level of ownership concentration is high, which gives strength to the dominant 
shareholders (Thillainathan, 1999). The dominant shareholders may act in their own interest by utilising the 
minority wealth (funds). The protection for minority shareholders against expropriation by dominant shareholders is 
very low which can increase agency problems (Claessens et al., 1999; Fazilah, 2002; Shleifer&Vishny, 1997). 
Therefore, it is expected that the concentrated ownership structure tend to increase agency problem.  
 
According to Larcker, Richardson and Tuna (2004), the definition of ownership relies on the fraction of outstanding 
shares held by an individual or group. The MCCG 2000 defines ownership (shareholder) based on an effective 
communication policy in the firms which allows shareholders to be involved in decision-making through voting 
rights and AGMs. Shareholding in Malaysian Publicly Listed Companies (PLCs) is concentrated and dominated by 
the family (Thillainathan, 1999). The next important categories of dominant shareholders by rank are the state, 
corporations and financial institutions. However, the empirical survey by Nam and Nam (2004) indicates that the 
majority of Malaysian companies belong to private business groups or corporations. Both studies indicate the 
change of ownership trend from concentrated dominated by family to business groups in Malaysian Publicly Listed 
Companies between 1999 and 2004.  
 
Zuaini (2004, pp. 45-48) divided ownership structure into two categories, based on the control or voting rights and 
the cash flow rights (ownership): 1) control rights are equal to cash flow rights (referred to as large ownership); and, 
2) control rights are above cash flow rights (referred to as ultimate ownership). Basically, individual shareholders in 
companies/corporations that have widely dispersed ownership do not have sufficient incentives to monitor the 
behaviour of the manager. They rely on managers to run the business or to control the cash flow (Shleifer&Vishny, 
1997). According to Zuaini (2004, p. 45), greater concentrations of ownership will lead to effective alignment of 
management and shareholders’ interests and result in higher performance. However, too concentrated ownership 
has been argued to reduce monitoring and let the dominant ownership exercise control for their benefit 
(Shleifer&Vishny, 1997). This transfers the agency problem away from the conflict between managers and 
shareholders, to the conflict between controlling shareholders (large shareholder and manager) and minority 
shareholders (Fan & Wong, 2002). This situation can create a serious loss of efficiency and expropriation of 
minority shareholders who do not participate in management and who are not a controlling shareholder. 
 
 
Ownership Structure and Firm Performance  
Numerous studies have analysed the link between ownership structure and firm performance. An empirical study by 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) found no significant correlation between ownership concentration and profit rates for 511 
large corporations. There is also a study which shows that higher ownership concentration leads to detrimental 
effects for corporations as large block holders and managers can collude to extract rents from small shareholders 
(Lehman &Weigand, 2000). Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) discovered a non-monotonic relation between 
Tobin’s Q and insider ownership. Increasing insider ownership between 0% and 5% has positive impact on Tobin’s 
Q. The effect is reversed for insider control over 5% to 25% of the voting rights, and it is again positively related to 
Q if management holds more than 25% of the equity. It seems that at low levels of insider ownership, the agency 
costs decrease. While with rising insider ownership and higher levels of insider control, agency costs increase but 
the management can maximise shareholder value.  
 
Joh (2003) analysed ownership structures and conflicts of interest among shareholders under a poor corporate 
governance system in Korea affected firm performance before the financial crisis (1993-1997). They found that 
firms with low ownership concentration show low firm profitability, controlling for firm and industry 
characteristics, and firms with a high disparity between control rights and ownership rights showed low 
profitability.Kapopoulos, and Lazaretou, (2007) in their study among 175 Greek listed firms found that ownership 
structure (managerial shareholdings and important shareholdings) is positively influence Tobin’s Q. The results 
suggest that the greater the degree to which shares are concentrated in the hands of outside or inside shareholders, 
the more effectively management behaviour is monitored and disciplined, thus resulting in better performance. 
 
Ming, Gee and Lee (2006) examined the impact of ownership structure on the corporate performance of Malaysian 
public-listed companies from 2002 to 2004. They found that the presence of insider and institutional equity 
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shareholdings do not provide an association with corporate performance. The results suggest that institutional 
shareholders failed in their monitoring role and the introduction of the corporate governance standards (MCCG 
2000) had also failed to influence shareholder value creation. Roszaini and Hudaid(2006) investigated the 
relationship between the corporate governance structure and performance in 347 Malaysia public listed companies 
in between 1996 and 2000. They found board size and top five substantial shareholdings to be significantly 
associated with both market and accounting performance measures. Tam and Tan added (2007, p. 208) that the 
protection of shareholders’ rights is a main issue in Malaysia because the large shareholders will dominantly control 
via ownership concentration and representation on company board and management. Based on data of Malaysia’s 
top 150 publicly listed firms, Tam and Tan (2007) found that governance practices such as adopting concentrated 
ownership and CEO–Chairman duality have affected firm performance. From the above discussion and prior 
literature, therefore the following hypotheses are stated as follows: 
 
H
H1 
= 
Changes in shareholder structure are positively associated with changes in firm 
performance. 
 
 
Methodology 
This study focuses on the ownership structure and firm performance of the publicly listed companies1 on the Main 
and Second Board of Bursa Malaysia (KLSE) in 1996 to 2008. A Pearson correlation analysisand multivariate 
regression analysis are conducted to empirically test the formulated hypothesis. The population of the research 
involves all the ‘Main Board’ and the ‘Second Board’ of the Publicly Listed Companies (PLCs)  in the Bursa 
Malaysia (formerly known as the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange), with the exception of the companies listed in the 
MESDAQ Market. Non-probably convenience sampling was employed in this research because the nature of the 
study requires only the companies that available with information about each director of the companies. A total of 
237 companies were identified to meet with the criteria.  
 
For accounting based measures, earning per share (denoted as EPS), return on assets (denoted as ROA) and return 
on equity (denoted as ROE) are used alternatively. EPS is calculated as earnings based on average common shares 
for the 12 months ended the last financial year, which is generated from DataStream. ROA and ROE are purely 
accounting based measures (profit ratios) and were computed from company financial statement data. The ROA is a 
useful measurement to indicate the profit of the company relative to total assets (Jong 2003). ROA rationally 
indicates management’s/company’s effectiveness in utilising the assets entrusted to them and does not depend on 
the alternative uses of debt versus equity to fund such assets (Robinson, 1998). Similar to ROA, ROE indicates 
management’s effectiveness in generating a return on the funds invested by the common shareholders, to whom 
management is ultimately responsible and accountable. For this study, the ROA and ROE were generated from 
DataStream data. The ROA and  ROE are calculated based on the following formula: 
 
 
ROA= (After tax profit)t 
 (Total assets)t-1 
 
ROE = (Net income before preferred dividends)t – (Preferred dividend requirement)t 
 (Common equity)t-1 
Where, 
Preferred dividend requirement = Actual cash dividend payment on preferred stock or the provision 
for preferred dividends, if in arrears. It also includes accretion on 
preferred stock.  
 
                                                             
1 Companies been listed in the Bursa Malaysia are either listed on 1) Bursa Malaysia Securities Main Board for larger capitalised companies, 2) 
the Second Board for the medium sized companies, or 3) the MESDAQ Market for high growth and technology companies. 
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Ownership structure is measured based on eight variables as follows: 1) number of family member owning shares in 
the company (SHFAMSZ); 2) number of director owning shares in the company (SHDIRSZ); 3) number of private 
institutions or companies owning shares in the company (SHINTSZ); 4) number of activist institutions owning 
shares in the company (SHACTSZ); 5) disclosure of  effective communication with shareholders through company  
proxies (SHCOMM); and 6) disclosure of annual general meeting held (SHAGM). 
 
Multivariate regression models: 
 
 
 
Where 
 
ΔFP i, = The change in firm performance (EPS, ROE, ROA, RET and RETadj)  
ΔSHFAMSZ = Change in the mean number of family members holding shares in the PLCs. 
ΔSHDIRSZ = Change in the mean number of director owned shares in the PLCs. 
ΔSHINSSZ = Change in the mean number of institution (private companies) owned shares in the PLCs. 
ΔSHACTSZ = Change in the mean number of activist institution owned shares in the PLCs. 
ΔSHCOMM = Change in the mean of disclosure about the PLCs has communication with shareholders. 
ΔSHAGM = Change in the mean of disclosure about the PLCs has held an AGM. 
*ΔLOGTA = Change in the mean of total assets 
*ΔLOGTS = Change in the mean of net sales 
Notes: * Control variables 
 
 
 
Results 
The Pearson correlation coefficients in Panel A, Table 2 show that among all the variables, only ΔLOGTSand ΔEPS 
is significantly positively correlated (r=0.188) at the 0.01 level. This positive correlation provides limited evidence 
that an increase in the firm size is associated with an increase in this particular measure of firm performance. 
 
 
Table 2:  Correlation coefficients and regression estimates for changes in shareholders structure variables and 
changes in firm performance for 237 PLCs. 
  ΔEPS  ΔROE   ΔROA  ΔRET  ΔRETadj 
Panel A - Pearson correlations    
ΔSHCOMM -0.073 0.040 0.019 -0.038 -0.055 
 (0.262) (0.544) (0.771) (0.557) (0.399) 
ΔSHAGM 0.006 0.011 -0.004 -0.092 -0.094 
 (0.932) (0.871) (0.951) (0.156) (0.151) 
ΔSHFAMSZ -0.030 0.042 0.062 0.033 0.044 
 (0.645) (0.519) (0.339) (0.610) (0.500) 
ΔSHDIRSZ 0.011 0.055 0.013 -0.012 -0.033 
 (0.861) (0.402) (0.846) (0.859) (0.615) 
ΔSHINSSZ 0.026 -0.091 -0.068 0.056 0.026 
 (0.691) (0.165) (0.296) (0.394) (0.696) 
ΔSHACTSZ 0.073 -0.020 0.022 -0.028 -0.063 
 (0.260) (0.758) (0.742) (0.668) (0.336) 
ΔLOGTS 0.188** 0.022 0.097 0.079 0.081 
 (0.004) (0.733) (0.136) (0.228) (0.212) 
ΔLOGTA 0.044 0.012 0.023 -0.031 -0.039 
 (0.496) (0.858) (0.730) (0.632) (0.548) 
Panel B – Spearman correlations 
ΔSHCOMM 0.047 0.041 0.051 -0.094 -0.105 
 (0.467) (0.530) (0.438) (0.148) (0.108) 
ΔSHAGM 0.024 0.065 0.015 -0.126 -0.127 
 (0.714) (0.321) (0.822) (0.052) (0.050) 
ΔSHFAMSZ -0.013 0.062 0.060 0.052 0.059 
ΔFP i, = β 0 +β1 ΔSHAGM i +β2ΔSHCOMM i +β3 ΔSHFAMSZ i +β4 
ΔSHDIRSZ i +β5 ΔSHINSSZ i +β6 ΔSHACTSZ i +  β7ΔLOGTS +  
β8ΔLOGTS + εi 
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 (0.847) (0.343) (0.357) (0.425) (0.367) 
ΔSHDIRSZ 0.095 0.055 0.033 0.002 -0.007 
 (0.146) (0.402) (0.614) (0.970) (0.911) 
ΔSHINSSZ 0.100 0.008 0.012 0.054 0.038 
 (0.125) (0.903) (0.854) (0.411) (0.564) 
ΔSHACTSZ 0.101 -0.007 0.019 -0.015 -0.040 
 (0.120) (0.920) (0.765) (0.817) (0.540) 
ΔLOGTS 0.324** 0.089 0.150* 0.189** 0.197** 
 (0.000) (0.174) (0.020) (0.003) (0.002) 
ΔLOGTA 0.210** -0.031 0.028 0.117 0.132* 
 (0.001) (0.640) 0.671 (0.073) (0.042) 
Panel C- Ordinary Least Square Regressions 
 Model a Model b Model c Model d Model e 
 ß t-value ß t-value ß t-value ß t-value ß t-value 
(Constant) 
-
0.379 
(0.705) -0.828 (0.408) -3.032 (0.003) -7.540 (0.000) -9.833 (0.000) 
ΔSHCOMM 
-
1.482 
(0.140) 0.461 (0.645) 0.124 (0.902) -0.153 (0.878) -0.460 (0.646) 
ΔSHAGM 0.698 (0.486) 0.017 (0.986) -0.034 (0.973) -1.290 (0.198) -1.223 (0.223) 
ΔSHFAMSZ 
-
0.469 
(0.640) 0.665 (0.507) 0.930 (0.353) 0.576 (0.565) 0.710 (0.479) 
ΔSHDIRSZ 
-
0.018 
(0.985) 0.948 (0.344) 0.257 (0.797) -0.079 (0.937) -0.334 (0.739) 
ΔSHINSSZ 0.257 (0.797) -1.419 (0.157) -1.033 (0.302) 0.734 (0.463) 0.174 (0.862) 
ΔSHACTSZ 1.125 (0.262) -0.625 (0.533) 0.052 (0.958) -0.374 (0.709) -0.969 (0.333) 
ΔLOGTS 2.897 (0.004) 0.390 (0.697) 1.496 (0.136) 1.246 (0.214) 1.390 (0.112) 
ΔLOGTS 0.090 (0.928) -0.001 (0.999) 0.015 (0.988) -0.679 (0.498) -0.767 (0.444) 
      
Adjusted R 0.017 -0.018 -0.016 -0.013 -0.008 
F statistic 1.523 0.482 0.546 0.625 0.773 
      
 
  *    Significant at the 0.05 level, ** Significant at the 0.01 level 
 
ΔSHCOMM  = Change in the mean extent of disclosure that the PLCs have communication with 
shareholders. 
Δ SHAGM = Change in the mean extent of disclosure that the PLCs have held an AGM. 
Δ SHFAMSZ = Change in the mean extent of disclosure about the number of family members holding 
shares in the PLCs. 
Δ SHDIRSZ = Change in the mean extent of disclosure about the number of director owned shares in the 
PLCs. 
Δ SHINSSZ = Change in the mean extent of disclosure about the number of institution (private 
companies) owned shares in the PLCs. 
Δ SHACTSZ = Change in the mean extent of disclosure about the number of activist institution owned 
shares in the PLCs. 
ΔLOGTS = Change in the mean total sales. 
ΔLOGTA = Change in the mean total assets. 
 
 
Panel B shows the Spearman correlation coefficients. Among all the variables, six significant correlations exist as 
follows: 1) ΔLOGTS and ΔEPS (r=0.324); 2) ΔLOGTS and ΔROA (r=0.150); 3) ΔLOGTS and ΔRET (r=0.189); 4) 
ΔLOGTS and ΔRETadj (r=0.197); 5) ΔLOGTA and ΔEPS (r=0.210); and 6) ΔLOGTA and ΔRETadj (r=0.132). All 
variables are significantly positively correlated at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels. This positive correlations provide 
evidence that an increase in firm size (LOGTS and LOGTA) is associated with the increase in the both accounting 
based measures (EPS, ROE and ROA) and market based measures (RET and RETadj). Therefore, bigger firm size 
has better firm performance. 
 
Panel C shows the results obtained from regressing changes in firm performance on the changes in shareholders 
structure variables. The results indicate that none of the models (a, b, c, d or e) are significant. However, only 
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ΔLOGTS (t=2.897) is positively and significantly associated with ΔEPS at the 0.01 level. This result provides some 
additional support for a positive relationship between changes in EPS and the firm size.  
 
Overall, the correlation and regression results do not provide strong support for hypothesis H1. Most changes in 
shareholders structure that increase compliance with the MCCG 2000 are not significantly associated with changes 
in firm performance. However, consistent support was found for a significant positive relationship between changes 
in the firm size (LOGTS) and the changes in one accounting based measure of firm performance, EPS. Due to the 
positive relation between firm size and firm performance, this suggests that larger PLCs have higher firm 
performance 
 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
This study has analysed the relationship of ownership structure and firm performance. Hypothesis 1 was tested by 
regressing changes in firm performance variables due to changes in shareholder structure variables. Similarly, the 
regression results provide that none of the models are significant. Only very limited evidence on the significant 
relationship between changes in firm size (ΔLOGTS) and changes in firm performance, EPS are found. This result 
suggests that larger PLCs have higher firm performance. This result provides very limited support for the 
hypothesis. Therefore, the results indicate that hypothesis 1 is not supported.  
 
This finding is in line with several prior studies, which also found that some shareholder structures were not 
significantly associated with firm performance. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) found no evidence for a relationship 
between the profit rate and the ownership concentration. Chang and Shin (2006) found no relationship between 
controlling family ownership and firm performance. Zeitun and Tian (2007) found that ownership concentration 
measured by HERF index (the sum of squared percentage of shares controlled by each top five shareholders) is not 
significant with firm performance.  
 
However, there are some inconsistencies between the results of this study and several earlier studies. The following 
ownership (shareholder)  structure has been found to be significantly associated with measures of firm performance: 
ownership concentration (Céspedes, González, & Molina, 2010; Joh, 2003; Margaritis&Psillaki, 2010; Zeitun& 
Tian, 2007), insider/managerial ownership (Agrawal &Knoeber, 1996; Bauguess et al., 2009; McConnell &Servaes, 
1990, 1995), block ownership (Patro, 2008), outsider ownership (Bauguess et al., 2009), voting power (Attig et al., 
2008), and large or controlling  shareholder (Attig et al., 2008; Volpin, 2002). These inconsistent results are 
probably caused by the different scopes and methods used. Therefore, there are inconclusive and mixed results in 
the literature between the shareholder structure and firm performance. 
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